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Article
DRAFT PROTECTION INSURANCE: ELITE ATHLETE LOSS-
OF-VALUE POLICIES AND THE EMERGING WAVE
OF COVERAGE LITIGATION
DANIEL J. KAIN, C. SCOTT TOOMEY & ROBERT L. JOYCE*
I. INTRODUCTION
From its humble 1936 origin at the Ritz-Carlton Hotel in Phila-
delphia, the National Football League (“NFL”) Draft has developed
into one of the most anticipated events of the sports calendar year.1
The NFL Draft will return to its birthplace in 2017.2  The city of
Philadelphia expects the event to attract more than 200,000 visitors
and generate revenue in excess of $86 million.3  While the NFL
Draft began as a closed door business meeting for NFL owners, it
now serves as a week-long festival for player prospects, fans, agents
and business partners to celebrate the sport of football.4
The same product that fuels the incredible success of the
NFL’s regular season drives the intrigue and popularity of the NFL
Draft, specifically, world class athletes.  NFL teams and their fans
aim to construct championship caliber rosters through a seven (7)
round Draft held by the NFL each spring.
The big business that is the NFL Draft directly and indirectly
impacts multiple industries, including insurance.5  A specialty insur-
* Messrs. Kain, Toomey and Joyce are partners at the law firm of Littleton
Joyce Ughetta Park and Kelly LLP.  Their practice specializes in sports litigation,
insurance coverage and commercial law.  Thanks to Stephanie Venuti and Jac-
quelyn Herder for their contributions to this article.  Special thanks to Andrew
Brandt and Amelia Curotto for providing this article opportunity.
1. See ROBERT W. PETERSON, PIGSKIN: THE EARLY YEARS OF PRO FOOTBALL 119
(1997) (discussing the origin of the NFL Draft); PETE WILLIAMS, THE DRAFT: A
YEAR INSIDE THE NFL’S SEARCH FOR TALENT 41–42 (2006).
2. See, e.g., Dan McQuade, The 2017 NFL Draft Will Be in Philadelphia, PHILA.
MAG. (Sep. 1, 2016, 12:22 PM), http://www.phillymag.com/news/2016/09/01/
2017-nfl-draft-philadelphia/ [https://perma.cc/A4MS-M6DR].
3. Id.
4. See Thomas Barrabi, Is the NFL Draft a Touchdown for Chicago’s Economy?, FOX
BUS. (Apr. 26, 2016), http://www.foxbusiness.com/features/2016/04/26/is-nfl-
draft-touchdown-for-chicagos-economy.html [https://perma.cc/3JMN-USVH].
5. See id. (stating that NFL Draft provides another vehicle for League’s busi-
ness partners such as Visa, Bud Light and Pepsi to capitalize on their investment
with onsite presence at “Draft Town”).  The 2015 NFL Draft “created more than
(217)
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ance policy has emerged in recent years to protect the draft value of
elite athletes projected for selection at the top of the NFL Draft’s
“big board.”6  Under the NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement
(“CBA”), rookie contracts are essentially pre-determined based
upon a player’s draft position.7  Thus, if a player projected as a top
five (5) NFL Draft selection sustains an injury in the season preced-
ing the Draft and consequently drops outside of first round consid-
eration, the resulting loss in draft value amounts to millions of
dollars.8
To guard against the risk of injury induced loss in draft value,
private insurers such as Lloyd’s of London (“Lloyd’s”) offer a prod-
uct known as “draft protection” or “loss-of-value” (“LOV”) insur-
ance to qualifying athletes.9  LOV policies aim to protect an elite
athlete’s future contract value from decreasing below a predeter-
mined threshold due to a significant injury or illness sustained dur-
ing the policy’s coverage period.10
2,000 temporary jobs and more than 800 permanent jobs” in industries such as
construction and labor. Id.
6. The term “big board” originates from the earliest NFL Drafts wherein
teams would write approximately ninety (90) names on a blackboard (“big board”)
in the draft selection meeting room. See ROBERT S. LYONS, ON ANY GIVEN SUNDAY:
A LIFE OF BERT BELL, 60 (2010); CHRIS WILLIS, THE MAN WHO BUILT THE NATIONAL
FOOTBALL LEAGUE: JOE F. CARR 341–43  (2010); Ty Schalter, History of the NFL Draft:
How Has the Process Evolved Over Time, BLEACHER REP. (Feb. 24, 2012), http://
bleacherreport.com/articles/1077925-history-of-the-nfl-draft-how-has-the-process-
evolved-over-time [https://perma.cc/2RW7-5RDL].
7. See NFL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, art. 7 (2011) [hereinafter
NFL CBA]; see also Richard R. Meyer, Finally, The 1st Real Test to Loss-of-Value Insur-
ance?, LAW360 (Feb. 24, 2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/763390/finally-
the-1st-real-test-to-loss-of-value-insurance [https://perma.cc/23WE-TBL2]).
8. By way of illustration, the projected contract value for the first pick in the
2016 NFL Draft amounted to $28.65 million whereas the projected contract value
for the final pick of the 2016 first round amounted to $9.49 million. See Anthony
Riccobono, NFL Draft 2016 Contracts: Projected Salaries for All First-Round Picks, INT.
BUS. TIMES (Apr. 28, 2016, 2:09 PM), http://www.ibtimes.com/nfl-draft-2016-con
tracts-projected-salaries-all-first-round-picks-2361279 [https://perma.cc/2ULH-
FH85].
9. See Loss-of-Value White Paper, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources
/insurance/loss-value-white-paper [https://perma.cc/SG6J-QNU8] (last visited
Jan. 29, 2017) See also NCAA Loss-of-Value, NCAA (webinar Feb. 11, 2016), available
at http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/insurance/loss-value-insurance-informa-
tion (click “WATCH: Loss of value webinar”) [hereinafter NCAA Loss-of-Value
Webinar] (last visited Jan. 29, 2017).  Multiple Lloyd’s wholesalers offer LOV prod-
ucts such as International Specialty Insurance, Exceptional Risk Advisors,
Hanleigh Insurance and Petersen International. Id.
10. Loss-of-Value White Paper, supra note 9; NCAA Webinar, supra note 9. See also
Meyer, supra note 7.
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Before issuing a policy, underwriters will first determine an ath-
lete’s eligibility based on his projected draft position.11  The under-
writers will then set an LOV threshold, which typically covers
approximately 50–60% of the athlete’s projected rookie contract.12
If the contract the athlete ultimately signs falls below that threshold
solely and directly due to the injury suffered during the coverage pe-
riod, the insurer pays the difference between the actual contract’s
value and the policy’s predetermined value.13
At first blush, both college players and their respective col-
legiate programs stand to benefit from LOV policies.  For players,
LOV policies provide the security required to perform at an excep-
tional level during their last season of collegiate play.  For collegiate
football programs, LOV policies provide a useful tool to incentivize
elite players to return to school after they become draft eligible.
However, very few players have successfully collected on an LOV
policy after submitting a claim.14  Successful recovery under an
LOV policy hinges on a number of factors, including, without limi-
tation, whether the player sustained a material injury as defined by
the policy, whether the player’s drop in draft status resulted solely
and directly as a result of his injury and whether the player and his
collegiate program disclosed all relevant medical information to
the insurer when applying for the LOV policy.15
11. Meyer, supra note 7.  According to the NCAA, only players projected for
selection within the top fifteen (15) picks in the NFL Draft should consider
purchasing an LOV policy. See Loss-of-Value White Paper, supra note 9; NCAA Loss-of-
Value Webinar, supra note 9.
12. Loss-of-Value White Paper, supra note 9; NCAA Loss-of-Value Webinar, supra
note 9.
13. Loss-of-Value White Paper, supra note 9; NCAA Loss-of-Value Webinar, supra
note 9.
14. Former University of Oregon cornerback Ifo Ekpre-Olomu stands as one
of the only athletes that has successfully collected on an LOV policy. See Meyer,
supra note 7.  After receiving a first round draft projection, Ekpre-Olomu took out
an LOV policy with a $40,000 premium. See Gregg E. Clifton, Is ‘Loss of Value’
Insurance Worth the Price for Student-Athletes, Universities?, COLLEGIATE & PROF. SPORTS
L. BLOG (May 8, 2015), http://www.collegeandprosportslaw.com/uncategorized/
is-loss-of-value-insurance-worth-the-price-for-student-athletes-universities/.  As a re-
sult of an injury sustained during his final collegiate playing season, Ekpre-Olomu
fell to the seventh round of the 2015 NFL Draft. See Meyer, supra note 7.  Ekpre-
Olomu collected a $3 million payout under his LOV policy without the need to
resort litigation. See Jeff Sistrunk, 3 Insurance Policies That Should Be in Athletes’
Playbooks, LAW360 (Jan. 29, 2016, 3:05 PM),  https://www.law360.com/articles/
751596/3-insurance-policies-that-should-be-in-athletes-playbooks [https://
perma.cc/MC6S-Y4YX].
15. See, e.g., Marc Tracy, Insurance Doesn’t Eliminate Risk for Top College Athletes
Who Forgo Draft, N.Y. TIMES (May 8, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/09
/sports/ncaafootball/insurance-doesnt-eliminate-risk-for-top-college-athletes-who-
forgo-draft.html?_r=0.
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A set of insurance coverage litigation has arisen out of elite
athlete LOV polices.16  The cases involve a pattern factual back-
drop.  Specifically, an elite college football player procures an LOV
policy during the year before he becomes draft eligible.17  The
player receives assistance from his university in completing the ap-
plication process, submitting medical information to the insurer
and facilitating payment of the LOV policy premium.18  During the
policy period, the player sustains an injury and his projected draft
position drops.19  Following the NFL Draft, the player submits a
claim to his insurer to collect under the terms of the LOV policy.20
The insurer denies the player’s claim, citing a number of de-
fenses.21  The player initiates a coverage lawsuit against his insurer
and/or school asserting various causes of action relative to the in-
surer’s non-payment of the policy.22
Part I of this Note will address LOV policy eligibility require-
ments, threshold determinations, premium funding, defenses and
exclusions.  Part II will review the claims and defenses raised in the
emerging set of LOV insurance coverage litigation.  Part III will ex-
plore the National Collegiate Athletic Association’s (“NCAA”) posi-
tion on LOV policies.  Finally, Part IV will discuss an emerging
trend involving the decision of multiple elite prospects to forego
the final Bowl game of their collegiate careers in order to mitigate
the risk of injury and the resulting loss in draft value.
16. See generally, e.g., Lee v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London, 2:15-cv-
01614-ODW-JC (C.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2015); Breslin v. Amtrust at Lloyd’s Ltd., 2:15-cv-
00330-R-AS (C.D. Cal. Jan. 15, 2015); Breslin v. Univ. of S. Cal., No. BC592870
(Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 28, 2015).
17. See, e.g., Complaint at para. 3, Lee v. Lloyd’s, No. 2:15-cv-01614-ODW-JC
[hereinafter Lee Complaint]; Complaint at para. 2, Breslin v. Lloyd’s, No.2:15-cv-
00326 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 15, 2015) (2:15-cv-00330-R-AS) [hereinafter Breslin v. Lloyd’s
Complaint]; Complaint at para. 21, Breslin v. Univ. of S. Cal., No. BC592870, (Cal.
Super. Ct. Aug. 28, 2015), (No. BC592870) [hereinafter Breslin v. USC
Complaint].
18. See Lee Complaint, supra note 17, at para. 13; Breslin v. Lloyd’s Com-
plaint, supra note 17, at para.18; Breslin v. USC Complaint, supra note 17, at para.
19.
19. See Lee Complaint, supra note 17, at paras. 17–19; Breslin v. Lloyd’s Com-
plaint, supra note 17, at para 21; Breslin v. USC Complaint, supra note 17, at paras.
21, 23.
20. See Lee Complaint, supra note 17, at para. 20; Breslin v. Lloyd’s Com-
plaint, supra note 17, at para. 22; Breslin v. USC Complaint, supra note 17, at para.
23.
21. See Lee Complaint, supra note 17, at para. 23; Breslin v. Lloyd’s Com-
plaint, supra note 17, at para. 22; Breslin v. USC Complaint, supra note 17, at para.
29.
22. See Lee Complaint, supra note 17, at paras. 24–33; Breslin v. Lloyd’s Com-
plaint, supra note 17, at paras. 31–33; Breslin v. USC Complaint, supra note 17, at
paras. 64–73.
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II. LOSS-OF-VALUE POLICY BACKGROUND
The process of applying for and comprehending the defini-
tions, terms and exclusions of LOV policies presents a unique chal-
lenge to elite collegiate football athletes.  The complexity of LOV
polices prompted the NCAA to hold a Webinar in February, 2016 to
educate representatives of member institutions and power confer-
ences.23  The questions raised by senior collegiate executives during
this Webinar demonstrate that LOV policies exceed the general
knowledge of industry professionals, much less collegiate athletes
lacking any agent or attorney representation.24
A. Eligibility Determination and Thresholds
According to the NCAA, only those players projected for selec-
tion at the apex of the NFL Draft (e.g., top fifteen [15]) should
consider purchasing LOV coverage.25  The NCAA reasons that play-
ers projected below top 15 consideration will face nearly insur-
mountable challenges in attempting to collect under an LOV
claim.26
In order to determine an applicant’s eligibility for a LOV pol-
icy, the insurance company will closely evaluate the player’s pro-
jected draft status.27  Here, the insurance company will consult with
a number of sources including NFL team scouts and other NFL
Draft experts.28  If an insurance company refuses to disclose its
draft projection sources to the player applicant, the NCAA cautions
the LOV applicant against doing business with that company.29
23. See NCAA Loss-of-Value Webinar, supra note 9.
24. Id. See also Darren Rovell, College Football Insurance Policies Are Big—But
Complex—Business, ESPN (Aug. 17, 2016), http://www.espn.com/college-football/
story/_/id/17328541/college-football-insurance-policies-big-complicated-business
[https://perma.cc/FQH8-G9KM].
25. Rovell, supra note 24. See also NCAA Loss-of-Value White Paper, supra note 9.
26. See Loss-of-Value White Paper, supra note 9.
27. See NCAA Loss-of-Value Webinar, supra note 9.
28. Id.  In addition to team scouts, insurers might consult with football media
experts such as Mel Kiper, Jr.  In 1984, ESPN hired Kiper as an independent foot-
ball scout to provide draft analysis. See Schalter, supra note 6.  Kiper’s signing pro-
vided ESPN and NFL fans with a taste of the data team scouts use to evaluate
college players. Id.  Kiper’s evaluation of NFL prospects brought NFL scouting to
the mainstream and directly contributed to the growth and popularity of the NFL
Draft.  LOV insurers might also reference publicly available scouting sources that
provide draft projections for prospects anticipated to declare eligibility during
each of the ensuing two (2) seasons. See, e.g., WalterFootball.com Updates, WALTER
FOOTBALL, http://walterfootball.com/index.php [https://perma.cc/5B2U-
GSUG] (last visited Apr. 13, 2017).
29. See NCAA Loss-of-Value Webinar, supra note 9.
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After the insurance company determines that a student athlete
projects as an elite first round selection in the NFL Draft, the in-
surer will set a loss-of-value threshold, which typically amounts to
50–60% of the projected rookie contract.30  By way of example,
where the player’s projected rookie contract projects to $10 million
over four (4) years, an insurance company might set the LOV
threshold at 60% of the rookie contract, resulting in a $6 million
LOV threshold.31
B. Premium Funding
Premiums for LOV policies range anywhere from $10,000 to
$95,000.32  Collegiate football players and programs obtain LOV
policies through two (2) methods of funding: (i) the player takes a
loan out against his future earnings or (ii) the collegiate football
program applies funds obtained from the school’s Student Assis-
tance Fund (“SAF”).  A discussion of collegiate athlete loans and
SAF fund allocation follows below.
1. Player Loans
The NCAA requires that a student-athlete maintain his or her
amateur status in order to participate in college athletics.33  A col-
legiate football player could lose his amateur status by using his or
her athletics skill (directly or indirectly) for pay in any form in that
sport.34  The NCAA defines “Pay” separately to include preferential
treatment, benefits or services because of the individual’s athletics
reputation, skill or pay-back potential as a professional athlete.35
Without an applicable exception to the NCAA’s basic amateur-
ism rule, use of future earnings as collateral for an LOV policy loan
would violate the NCAA’s prohibition of extra benefits for student-
athletes.  Generally, a student-athlete may not receive any benefit
30. See id.; NCAA Loss-of-Value White Paper, supra note 9.
31. Loss-of-Value White Paper, supra note 9; NCAA Loss-of-Value Webinar, supra
note 9.  Note that the LOV policy holder only receives a benefit under the policy if
the rookie contract is less than the LOV threshold. Loss-of-Value White Paper, supra
note 9; NCAA Loss-of-Value Webinar, supra note 9.  If the rookie contract exceeds the
threshold, the player does not recover under the policy. Loss-of-Value White Paper,
supra note 9; NCAA Loss-of-Value Webinar, supra note 9.
32. See Loss-of-Value White Paper, supra note 9; NCAA Loss-of-Value Webinar, supra
note 9. See also Lee Complaint, supra note 17, at para. 15 (stating that Lee paid
Lloyd’s a $94,600 premium to obtain his LOV policy).
33. See NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, 2016–17 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL,
Bylaw 12.01.1 (2016) [hereinafter NCAA MANUAL] (“[o]nly an amateur student-
athlete is eligible for intercollegiate athletics participation in a particular sport.”).
34. Id. at Bylaw 12.1.2(a).
35. Id. at Bylaw 12.1.2.1.6.
6
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that is not generally available to all of the school’s students.36
Within the extra benefit rules, the NCAA also specifically prohibits
a student-athlete from receiving a deferred pay-back loan based on
the student-athlete’s athletics reputation, skill or pay-back potential
as a future professional athlete.37
In order to provide student athletes with the option and incen-
tive to return to collegiate play after they become draft eligible, the
NCAA carved out an exception to its amateurism rule such that stu-
dent athletes can fund insurance policies through a loan against
future earnings.38  Under this exception, a collegiate football player
can borrow against his future earnings potential for the purpose of
purchasing insurance against a disabling injury or illness.39  As ex-
plained by Maria Gleason, an NCAA Operations and Risk Manager:
“we wanted to give student athletes who have professional prospects
a real choice to stay in school . . . .  We wanted to make it possible
for them to insure against future loss if they made that choice to
stay in school.”40
2. Student Assistance Fund
Subject to conference policies and procedures, the NCAA per-
mits member institutions to use money from the SAF to purchase
LOV policy premiums.41  According to the NCAA, schools may use
their SAF to assist student-athletes in meeting financial needs that
arise in conjunction with participation in intercollegiate athletics.42
Schools possess approximately $300,000–$350,000 in their SAF.43
36. Id. at Bylaw 16.11.1.1.
37. Id. at Bylaw 16.11.1.2.
38. See, e.g., Jill Wieber Lens & Joshua Lens, Insurance Coverage for Elite Student-
Athletes, 84 MISS. L.J. 127, 153–57 (2014) (providing extensive analysis of policy
reasons underlying NCAA’s amateurism exception).
39. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 33, at Bylaws 12.1.2.4.4, 16.11.1.4.  Member
institutions may designate staff members to assist athletes with arrangements for
securing the loan and insurance. Id.  The institution shall retain copies of all doc-
uments related to loan transactions and insurance policies, regardless of whether
the institution is involved in the arrangements. Id.
40. Wieber Lens & Lens, supra note 38, at 154 –55.
41. See Loss-of-Value White Paper, supra note 9; NCAA Loss-of-Value Webinar, supra
note 9.
42. See Student Assistance Fund Guidelines, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/sites/
default/files/2013+Student+Assistance+Fund.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2017). See
also Wieber Lens & Lens, supra note 38, at 161 n.163.
43. Weiber Lens and Lens, supra note 38, at p. 163–64 . See also Dennis Dodd,
Leonard Fournette’s $10M Policies and the Unregulated World of Player Protection, CBSS-
PORTS (May 12, 2016), http://www.cbssports.com/college-football/news/leonard-
fournettes-10m-policies-and-the-unregulated-world-of-player-protection/ [https://
perma.cc/DV6V-22TR]. See also David McCoy, NCAA’s Little-Known Student Assis-
tance Fund, CBS MINN. (Jan. 12, 2014, 11:17 PM)  http://minnesota.cbslocal.com/
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Collegiate executives like the Commissioner of the Big 12 and
Chairman of the NCAA Football Oversight Committee have ex-
pressed discomfort in member institutions using SAF money to
fund LOV premiums: “I’m not comfortable having the Student As-
sistance Fund used for those things. . . . It’s a very large premium,
typically, and it takes away from other kids.”44
No question exists that schools will use every competitive tool
at their disposal to (i) recruit the highest rated football athletes out
of high school and (ii) retain them once the players become draft
eligible.  Subsidizing elite players’ LOV polices presents one arrow
in a school’s recruiting/retention quiver.  As explained by Kevin
Sumlin, the head coach of Texas A&M University’s football pro-
gram, the question players ask when they become draft eligible is
“what about injury?”45  However, a school’s willingness to subsidize
a player’s LOV premium incentivizes the player to return to school
after he becomes draft eligible and “takes away a lot of the ‘[w]hat
if’?”46
Texas A&M spent close to $60,000 from its SAF to pay the pre-
mium for offensive lineman Chris Ogbuehi’s LOV policy.47  When
considering whether to enter the NFL Draft after his junior year,
Ogbuehi received draft evaluations indicating he would likely be a
first round selection.48  To incentivize Ogbuehi to return to school
for his senior season, Texas A&M offered to use SAF resources to
pay his LOV policy premium.49  Ogbuehi explained that the
school’s willingness to pay his LOV premium “really helped with
[his] decision” and provided “great reassurance knowing that (com-
ing back for one more season) is not as big of a risk-reward.”50
2014/01/12/ncaas-little-known-student-assistance-fund/ [https://perma.cc/
8EM5-TZCF]
44. Dodd, supra note 43.
45. Tracy, supra note 15.
46. Id.  Florida State University reportedly used SAF money to pay the LOV
premium for quarterback Jameis Winston, who obtained $10 million in combined
PTD and LOV coverage. See Jared Shanker, FSU Chips in on Winston’s Insurance,
ESPN (Aug. 5, 2014), http://espn.go.com/college-football/story/_/id/
11310051/jameis-winston-insurance-policy-paid-part-florida-state [https://
perma.cc/YJU6-WQCD].
47. See Bruce Feldman, How Texas A&M Paid Over $50,000 to Get Cedric
Ogbuehi Back for 2014, FOX SPORTS (July 16, 2014, 6:00 PM), http://
www.foxsports.com/college-football/story/texas-am-aggies-paid-nearly-60-grand-
top-nfl-prospect-cedric-ogbuehi-071614 [https://perma.cc/XEK5-GKE7].
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
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During Nick Saban’s tenure as the head coach of the Univer-
sity of Alabama’s football program, he has recruited and received
commitments from the highest percentage of five (5) star football
prospects nationwide.51  Coach Saban recognizes the slippery slope
inherent in rating and insuring athletes at such a young age:
“[p]retty soon, they’re going to be rating a five-star in high school
[for draft protection insurance].”52
Due to the limited SAF money available to subsidize elite ath-
lete LOV premiums, an attendee of the NCAA’s February, 2016
Webinar asked whether universities could fund LOV policies out of
their general athletic department or university budgets.53  After a
cognizable pause, a member of the NCAA panel answered the ques-
tion by stating: “no.”54  In order for member institutions to fund
LOV policies directly through general university budget dollars, a
specific legislative proposal to the NCAA would need to occur.55
C.  Policy Defenses & Exclusions
The NCAA cautions student athletes that simply procuring an
LOV policy does not guarantee collection under the policy in the
event an injury or illness occurs during the policy’s coverage pe-
riod.56  A number of defenses and exclusions exist that render col-
lection under an LOV claim difficult.
1. Causation
Proving that an injury or illness presents the sole and direct
cause of a player’s loss in draft value presents a primary obstacle in
a player’s effort to successfully collect under an LOV policy.57  The
positional needs of teams slotted at the top of the Draft board dic-
tate, in large part, which players get selected with the top fifteen
(15) picks.58  By way of example, an elite running back prospect
might sustain an injury within his LOV policy coverage period and
51. See, e.g., 2017 Alabama Football Commitment List, ESPN, http://www.espn
.com/colleges/alabama/football/recruiting/commitments [https://perma.cc/
3NGW-KJDM] (last visited Apr. 13, 2017).
52. Dodd, supra note 43.
53. See NCAA Loss-of-Value Webinar, supra note 9.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. See Loss-of-Value White Paper, supra note 9.
57. See, e.g., Tracy, supra note 15; NCAA Loss-of-Value White Paper, supra note 9
(citing standard policy exclusions such as pre-existing injuries and illnesses, drug
or alcohol use, criminal acts and mental, nervous or psychological disease or
disorder).
58. See NCAA Loss-of-Value Webinar, supra note 9.
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ultimately receive a rookie contract that falls below his LOV thresh-
old figure.  Here, the insurer might employ a defense that teams
atop the Draft board passed on the prospect not because of his
prior injury, but rather, due to those teams’ relative roster strength
at the running back position.  For instance, NFL teams with
franchise running backs in their prime (e.g., Ezekiel Elliott and
Le’Veon Bell) will not likely expend a first round Draft selection on
a running back prospect.
Another factor that could adversely impact a prospect’s ability
to collect on an LOV policy pertains to his performance through-
out the pre-Draft scouting process.  NFL Draft prospects participate
in a series of scouting events that include, without limitation, the
Senior Bowl, NFL Scouting Combine and college Pro Days.  During
these events, NFL scouts from every team in the League will study
the premier prospects at each positional group and assess their per-
formance within a battery of targeted drills and testing.  Here, a
draft prospect’s status could falter for reasons entirely unrelated to
the injury or illness he sustained during the LOV policy period.59
For instance, a quarterback’s draft stock might drop due to his
throwing or footwork mechanics, comprehension of complex NFL
coverage schemes and/or field vision.60  Similarly, a wide receiver’s
draft value could plummet if it becomes apparent that his skills as a
route runner require significant development.  Under either of
these hypothetical scenarios, a defense exists that a drop in draft
value resulted from poor performance during the scouting season,
rather than the player’s prior injury.
Off the field issues present an additional factor unrelated to a
player’s injury that could present an independent cause of dimin-
ished draft value.61  Here, one could foresee a scenario wherein a
player sustains an injury during the policy period, recovers from the
injury, performs excellent throughout the scouting events but
makes a poor off the field decision that adversely impacts his draft
59. See NCAA Loss-of-Value White Paper, supra note 9 (citing poor performance
at Draft Scouting Combine as specific basis unrelated to injury that could cause
player’s draft value to falter).
60. See id. (explaining that trade or free agency decision made by team prior
to NFL Draft could impact whether team requires elite draft prospect at that
position).
61. In 2016, the NFL inaugurated a policy banning prospects from attending
the Scouting Combine with misdemeanor or felony convictions involving violence
or use of a weapon, domestic violence or sexual misconduct/assault. See Les
Bowen, NFL Scouting Combine’s Exclusive Message for Problem Players, PHILA. INQ. (Feb.
26, 2017).  The NFL also sent a memo to all teams stating: “The NFL also reserves
the right to deny participation of any prospect dismissed by their university or the
NCAA.” Id.
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status.  For instance, a player might be arrested for driving under
the influence within a month of the NFL Draft.62  Alternatively,
photographs of the prospect could surface on social media on or
around Draft night that bring the prospect’s judgment or character
into question.63  While unfortunate, under either of these scena-
rios, a player would have extreme difficulty proving that an injury
sustained during the policy period presents the sole and direct cause
of his diminished draft value.
2. Disclosure of Medical Information
Upon receipt of a claim made under an LOV policy, an insurer
might deem the policy void, claiming that the insured athlete failed
to disclose material medical information and documents during the
policy application process.64  An insurer’s contention that the ath-
lete’s LOV application contains material misstatements and medi-
cal omissions might implicate the player’s school.65  In certain
instances—if not a majority—the player’s school plays a primary
role in assisting the student athlete with the LOV application pro-
cess, including the collection of relevant medical information and
records.66  The collegiate institution might control all lines of com-
munication with the insurance underwriters throughout the appli-
cation process.67  As one might expect, a school’s direct
involvement in the LOV application process could implicate the
school in coverage litigation liability should the insurer deem a pol-
icy void on the basis of missing or inaccurate medical information.
III. LOSS-OF-VALUE LITIGATION
A recent set of coverage litigation has arisen out of LOV poli-
cies issued to elite athletes from The University of Southern Califor-
nia’s (“USC”) football program, Marqise Lee and Morgan Breslin.
The Lee and Breslin litigation share many similarities as Lee and
Breslin played for the same football program (USC) and obtained
62. See, e.g., Chase Goodbread, Analysts Assess Dak Prescott’s Draft Stock Following
DUI Arrest, NFL (last updated Mar. 14, 2016, 6:21 PM), http://www.nfl.com/news/
story/0ap3000000644248/article/analysts-assess-dak-prescotts-draft-stock-follow
ing-dui-arrest [https://perma.cc/6XA7-8XBN].
63. See, e.g., Victor Mather, Laremy Tunsil Falls in N.F.L. Draft After Apparent
Drug Video Surfaces, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 28, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/
04/29/sports/laremy-tunsil-falls-in-nfl-draft-after-drug-video-surfaces.html?_r=0.
64. See Tracy, supra note 15. See also supra note 17 and accompanying text.
65. See, e.g., Breslin v. USC Complaint, supra note 17, at paras. 19, 21.
66. Id.
67. Id.
11
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LOV policies from the same insurer (Lloyd’s).  A summary of this
litigation follows below.
A. Marqise Lee Litigation
In 2012, Lee led all wide receivers nationwide in total recep-
tions and he earned Pac-12 Offensive Player of the Year honors.68
As the reigning Biletnikof Award winner (an honor reserved for the
top receiver in all of college football), Lee projected as top first-
round NFL Draft selection.69  In August 2013, Lee submitted an
application to purchase a “loss of value” policy from Llyod’s to re-
cover or mitigate any future loss of income that might result if he
sustained an injury during the August 15, 2013, to August 1, 2014,
insurance policy period, which encompassed the entire 2013 col-
lege football season.70
Per the terms of the policy, Lloyd’s agreed to indemnify Lee
for “loss of value” in the event his rookie NFL contract did not total
$9,600,000 or more as a result of an injury occurring during the
insurance policy period.71  On September 28, 2013, Lee sustained a
knee injury in a game against Arizona State University.72  He
treated with a physician following the game and received a diagno-
sis of a medial collateral ligament sprain, bone contusion, posterior
sprain and popliteal cyst in his left knee.73  Lee missed multiple
games following the injury.74
During the 2014 NFL Draft, Lee fell from his projected first
round status to the second round where the Jacksonville Jaguars
selected him with the thirty-ninth (39th) overall selection.75  This
decline in draft status amounted to a multi-million-dollar loss as the
$5.2 million rookie contract he signed fell millions below the $9.6
million threshold set forth in Lee’s LOV policy.76
Shortly after the 2014 NFL Draft, Lee submitted a claim to
Lloyd’s to recover this “loss of value” under the terms of his LOV
68. See Lee Complaint, supra note 17, at para. 12.
69. Id. at para. 4. See also Meyer, supra note 7.
70. See Lee Complaint, supra note 17, at para. 3.  Lloyd’s sold the LOV policy
to Lee per a $94,600.00 premium (Policy Certificate No. RCA06813392). Id. at
paras. 3, 15.  USC’s Office of NCAA Compliance assisted Lee in obtaining the pol-
icy from Lloyd’s. Id. at para. 13.
71. Id. at para. 16.
72. Id. at para. 17.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at paras. 4, 18.
76. Id. at paras. 4, 19. See also Meyer, supra note 7.
12
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policy.77  In March, 2015, Lloyd’s denied Lee’s claim and sought to
rescind Lee’s LOV policy, contending that Lee failed to disclose
certain medical information when applying for the subject policy.78
In March, 2015, Lee filed suit against Lloyd’s in the United
States District Court for the Central District of California.79  In seek-
ing to recover the difference between the $9.6 million threshold of
his LOV policy and the $5.2 million rookie contract he received,
Lee asserted claims against Lloyd’s sounding in breach of contract
and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair deal-
ing.80  Essentially, Lee contended that Lloyd’s denial of his claim
constituted a breach of the LOV policy and that Lloyd’s denied his
claim in bad faith.81  In addition to compensatory damages, Lee
sought punitive damages from Lloyd’s.82
On the same day that Lee filed his bad faith suit against Lloyd’s
in the Central District of California, Lloyd’s filed a separate declara-
tory judgment action in The United States District Court of New
Jersey.83  In its Complaint, Lloyd’s alleged Lee made material mis-
representations, omissions and/or concealments in the medical in-
formation submitted with his LOV policy.84  Accordingly, Lloyd’s
contended, inter alia, that the LOV policy never took effect, that
rescission of the policy proved appropriate and that the policy was
null and void from its inception.85
The District of New Jersey transferred Lloyd’s declaratory judg-
ment action to the Central District of California.86  Following trans-
fer, the Central District of California granted multiple stipulations
from the parties to extend their respective responsive pleading
deadlines.87  Before any substantive briefing on the merits or bench
77. See Lee Complaint, supra note 17, at para. 5.
78. Id.
79. See id.  In Lee’s pleading, he averred that the ability to purchase LOV
insurance is indispensable to NCAA football as it incentivizes student athletes to
continue playing college football notwithstanding the risks to their future NFL
careers and their projected multimillion dollar earnings as professional football
players. Id. at para. 2.
80. Id.
81. Id. at para. 6.
82. Id. at para. 33.
83. See Lee Complaint, supra note 17.
84. Id. at paras. 2, 3, 4, 18.
85. Id. at para. 8.
86. See Lee v. Lloyd’s, 2:16-cv-02622-ODW-JC, at Dkt. No. 33.
87. See, e.g., Lee v. Lloyd’s, 2:15-cv-01614-ODW-JC, Dkt. Nos. 30, 33, 38, 40, 42,
44, 46, 48.
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trial occurred, the parties reached a settlement of their respective
claims.88
B. Morgan Breslin Litigation
Morgan Breslin played linebacker on the same USC football
team as Lee during the 2012 and 2013 seasons.  Breslin projected as
an early round prospect in the 2013 NFL Draft.89  He elected to
return to USC for the 2013 football season and to forego entry into
the 2013 NFL Draft.90  In September, 2013, Breslin applied for and
obtained an LOV policy through Lloyd’s to recover or mitigate any
loss in income that might occur if he sustained an injury during the
policy period of August 27, 2013 through August 1, 2014, which
included the entire 2013 football season.91
Breslin sustained an injury during a September 28, 2013 game
against Arizona State University.92  He treated with a physician fol-
lowing the Arizona State game—voicing complaints of groin pain.93
Breslin subsequently underwent a sports hernia surgery on Novem-
ber 19, 2013 and an adductor longus repair surgery on April 8,
2014.94  Breslin played in only five (5) games during the 2013 sea-
son.95  He was not invited to the NFL Combine nor did any team
select him during the 2014 NFL Draft.96  Shortly following the 2014
NFL Draft, Breslin submitted a claim to Lloyd’s to recover under
the terms of his LOV policy.97
On December 12, 2014, Lloyd’s filed a declaratory judgment
action in the District of New Jersey.98  Lloyd’s alleged that Breslin
misrepresented, omitted and/or concealed certain medical infor-
mation from his LOV policy application.99  Like the Lee action,
Lloyd’s sought a declaration that the LOV policy did not take effect,
that rescission of the policy proved lawful and that any claim made
by Breslin to collect under the policy lacked merit.100
88. Id. at Dkt. Nos. 59–61.
89. See Breslin v. Lloyd’s Complaint, supra note 17, at para. 17.
90. Id.
91. Id. at para. 2, 20.
92. Id. at para. 21.
93. Id.
94. Breslin v. Lloyd’s Complaint, supra note 17, at para. 21.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at para. 22.
98. See Breslin v. Lloyd’s Complaint, supra note 17.
99. Id. at paras. 2–3 .
100. Id. at Prayer for Relief.
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One month after Lloyd’s declaratory judgment filing, Breslin
filed a Complaint against Lloyd’s in the Central District of Califor-
nia.101  Breslin asserted multiple claims against Lloyd’s including
breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing and bad faith denial of insurance benefits.102  Breslin
sought both compensatory and punitive damages from Lloyd’s.103
The District of New Jersey transferred Lloyd’s declaratory judgment
action to the Central District of California.104  Similar to the Lee
litigation, Breslin and Lloyd’s settled their claims against one an-
other without any substantive briefing on the merits or a bench
trial.105
Before Breslin and Lloyd’s resolved their claims against one
another, Breslin filed a separate suit against USC in Los Angeles
County state court.106  Breslin alleged that USC’s advice to elite stu-
dent-athletes regarding LOV polices plays a substantial role in re-
taining athletes once they become draft eligible.107  The Complaint
states that Breslin purchased his LOV policy based on the advice
and representations of USC that the policy would protect him in
the event that he sustained a qualifying injury.108  The Complaint
further alleges that USC directed Breslin in every step related to the
policy, including completion of the application, providing medical
documentation to the underwriters and acquiring a bank note to
pay for the policy.109
According to the Complaint, USC controlled all lines of com-
munication with Lloyd’s and Breslin had no direct communication
with the insurer during the application process.110  As the sole
source of information regarding the subject LOV policy, Breslin al-
leged that USC owed a duty to Breslin to explain the risks and bene-
101. See generally Breslin v. Lloyd’s Complaint, supra note 17.
102. Id. at paras. 31–33.
103. Id. at paras. 35.
104. See Breslin v. Lloyd’s, 2:15-cv-02441, Dkt. Nos. 27–29.
105. Id. at Dkt. No. 67–68.
106. See Breslin v. USC Complaint, supra note 17.
107. Id. at para. 13.  The Complaint also states that school and NCAA regula-
tions prohibit student athletes from retaining an agent, financial advisor or con-
tract adviser to help digest, negotiate and comply with the dense terms of elite
athlete insurance policies. Id. at para. 14.  Further, the pleading alleges that these
athletes are only just out of their teens without a complete college education,
much less expertise in navigating complicated coverage terms. Id.
108. Id. at Preliminary Statement.
109. Id.  Breslin further alleges that USC failed to provide him with any copy
of the policy during the application process. Id. at para. 56.
110. Id. at paras. 15, 19.
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fits of entering into the policy.111  Likewise, the Complaint alleges
that USC owed a duty to Breslin to ensure that elite athletes cor-
rectly complete the application documentation and that all medical
information provided to the insurer proves true and accurate.112
While Breslin asserts a host of claims against USC, the primary
claim sounds in breach of contract.113  The Complaint asserts that
USC promised to manage Breslin’s relationship with Lloyd’s, and in
exchange, Breslin promised by his conduct to forgo the 2013 NFL
Draft and remain at USC for another season.114  Breslin alleges that
USC breached its duties under the contract by failing to appropri-
ately complete the LOV application and failing to submit complete
and accurate medical information to Lloyd’s.115  Ultimately, Breslin
alleges that if any omission or misstatement of medical information
transpired with respect to his LOV policy application, USC bears
the responsibility.116  As a remedy, Breslin seeks both compensatory
and punitive damages from USC.117
IV. NCAA’S POSITION ON LOSS-OF-VALUE POLICIES
The NCAA gave consideration to whether it should offer LOV
policies directly to student athletes through its Exceptional Student-
Athlete Disability Insurance Program (“ESDI program”).118  The
NCAA’s ESDI program enables qualifying student-athletes, to
purchase a permanent total disability insurance policy (“PTD policy”)
with pre-approved financing if necessary.119  PTD policies offered
through the NCAA’s ESDI program protect student-athletes against
future loss of earnings as a professional athlete due to a total disa-
bling injury or sickness that may occur during the collegiate ca-
111. Breslin v. USC Complaint, supra note 17, at para. 15.
112. Id.
113. Id. at paras. 27–31.  In addition to breach of contract, Breslin’s claims
against USC include, without limitation, negligence, breach of fiduciary duty,
fraudulent concealment and false promise. See generally Breslin v. USC Complaint,
supra note 17.
114. Id. at par. 28.
115. Id. at par. 30.
116. Id. at Preliminary Statement.
117. Id. at Prayer for Relief.
118. See Loss-of-Value White Paper, supra note 9; NCAA Loss-of-Value Webinar,
supra note 9.  In October 1990, a disability insurance program was initiated for
exceptional student-athletes at NCAA institutions in the sports of football and
men’s basketball. See Student-Athlete Insurance Programs, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.
org/about/resources/insurance/student-athlete-insurance-programs [https://
perma.cc/X45Y-ZXMZ] (last visited Feb. 12, 2017).
119. See Loss-of-Value White Paper, supra note 9; NCAA Loss-of-Value Webinar,
supra note 9.
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reer.120  The injury or illness sustained during the designated
coverage period must prevent the player from ever competing as a
professional athlete (i.e., must be a career-ending injury or illness).
To become eligible for coverage under a PTD policy, the football
player must be projected for selection in the first two (2) rounds of
the NFL Draft.121
In evaluating whether to offer LOV policies to student athletes
through the ESDI program, the NCAA assembled a task force that
included chief financial officers from various Division I Football
Bowl Subdivision (“FBS”) conference members and NFL player per-
sonnel experts such as Bill Polian.122  In light of the checkered pay-
out history, policy defenses and emerging set of coverage litigation,
the NCAA decided against offering LOV polices through its ESDI
program, reasoning that LOV polices “are not the business the
NCAA should be in” at this time.123
V. PLAYERS MITIGATING RISK BY FOREGOING BOWL GAMES
The risk of sustaining a significant injury during a collegiate
bowl game is not lost on elite prospects projected for selection at
the top of the NFL Draft.  At the conclusion of the 2016 football
season, star running backs Leonard Fournette of Louisiana State
University and Christian McCaffrey of Stanford University elected
to forego playing in their teams’ Bowl games.124  Their decisions
stirred a media hornets’ nest as several outlets ruminated about
120. Loss-of-Value White Paper, supra note 9; NCAA Loss-of-Value Webinar, supra
note 9.
121. Loss-of-Value White Paper, supra note 9; NCAA Loss-of-Value Webinar, supra
note 9.
122. See NCAA Loss-of-Value Webinar, supra note 9.
123. Id.
124. See Matt Bonesteel, Stanford’s Christian McCaffrey Joins LSU’s Leonard
Fournette in Skipping Bowl Game, WASH. POST (Dec. 19, 2016), https://www.wash
ingtonpost.com/news/early-lead/wp/2016/12/19/stanford-christian-mccaffrey-
joins-lsus-leonard-fournette-in-skipping-bowl-game/?utm_term=.7d5f325cd61e
[https://perma.cc/5HHV-E82F]. LSU played Louisville in the 2016 Citrus Bowl
game that Fournette elected to sit out. See Alex Kirshner, 2016 Citrus Bowl, LSU vs.
Louisville, SBNATION (Dec. 4, 2016, 3:18 PM), http://www.sbnation.com/college-
football/2016/12/4/12667804/lsu-louisville-citrus-bowl-2016-teams-date-tv-sched
ule [https://perma.cc/AH6J-XH9G].  Stanford played North Carolina in the 2016
Sun Bowl game that McCaffrey elected to sit out. See Andy Hutchins, 2016 Sun
Bowl, North Carolina vs. Stanford, SBNATION (Dec. 4, 2016, 4:40 PM), http://
www.sbnation.com/college-football/2016/12/4/12665772/unc-stanford-sun-bowl-
2016-teams-date-tv-schedule [https://perma.cc/YH5Q-DD54].
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whether this could mark the beginning of a trend for future
years.125
For over a century, the culmination of a college football
player’s season has involved playing in a bowl game on or around
New Year’s Day.126  American football fans look forward to watching
high caliber NFL prospects compete in collegiate bowl games every
year.  Blue chip games such as the Sugar Bowl, Orange Bowl and
Fiesta Bowl represent big business for television networks, universi-
ties and the Bowl organizations themselves.127  Should it become
commonplace for elite prospects to forego bowl games, television
viewership and bowl attendance could decline markedly.
The cost-benefit calculus driving a player’s decision to sit out
his bowl game is not complex.  As a projected first-round selection
in the NFL Draft, the player has already established his value to
NFL scouts over multiple collegiate seasons, so the player arguably
stands little to gain from completing in one more game.  This holds
particularly true in situations faced by Messrs. Fournette and Mc-
Caffrey where the bowl outcome holds no National Championship
implications.128  As for the cost aspect of a prospect’s analysis, a sig-
nificant injury sustained in a bowl game likely precludes a player’s
ability to perform at the NFL Scouting Combine and other pre-
Draft scouting events such as Pro Days.
A textbook example of an elite prospect sustaining a bowl
game injury and suffering a resulting loss in draft value involves
former University of Notre Dame linebacker Jaylon Smith.129  Given
Smith’s explosive athletic traits and sideline-to-sideline speed, he
projected as a consensus top 5 pick in the 2016 NFL Draft.130  While
playing in the Fiesta Bowl in his final collegiate season, Smith tore
125. See, e.g., Victor Mather, Stanford’s Christian McCaffrey Is Latest Star to Skip
Bowl Game, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/19/
sports/football/christian-mccaffrey-stanford-skip-sun-bowl.html?_r=0; Laura Wag-
ner, College Football Players’ Decisions to Skip Bowl Games Garner Support, Some Criticism,
NPR (Dec. 20, 2016, 6:18 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/
12/20/506323930/college-football-players-decisions-to-skip-bowl-games-garner-
support-some-critic; Jon Solomon, College Bowl Director Pay Rises as Fournette, McCaf-
frey Skip Bowl Games, CBSSPORTS (Dec. 29, 2016), http://www.cbssports.com/col
lege-football/news/college-bowl-director-pay-rises-as-fournette-mccaffrey-skip-
bowl-games/ [https://perma.cc/5CQ5-UTDQ].
126. See Mather, supra note 125.
127. In 2014–2015, the Sugar Bowl, Orange Bowl and Fiesta Bowl com-
manded the following net assets: Sugar Bowl ($70 million), Orange Bowl ($55.1
million), Fiesta Bowl ($54.5 million). See Solomon, supra note 125.
128. See Mather, supra note 125.
129. Id.
130. See Jaylon Smith Prospect Profile, NFL.COM, http://www.nfl.com/draft/
2016/profiles/jaylon-smith?id=2555310 (last visited Mar. 10, 2017) (describing
18
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the medial collateral ligament and anterior cruciate ligament in his
left knee.131  Instead of commanding a rookie contract of $20 mil-
lion or more as a top 5 pick in the 2016 NFL Draft, Smith fell to the
second round, signing a $6 million rookie contract with the Dallas
Cowboys.132  Smith did not play for the Cowboys during his rookie
season as he rehabilitated his left knee injuries.133
The most recent example of an injury sustained by an elite
prospect during a bowl game involves former University of Michi-
gan tight end Jake Butt.134  As a senior tight end, Butt won the 2016
Mackey Award given to the nation’s best tight end.135  Many draft
experts consider Butt a top NFL prospect.136  Entering the bowl sea-
son, ESPN NFL Draft analyst Mel Kiper ranked Butt as the third-
best draft-eligible tight end for the 2017 draft class.137  During the
2016 Orange Bowl, Butt tore the anterior cruciate ligament in his
right knee.138  Shortly after sustaining the injury, Butt stated that it
“never once crossed my mind to sit this game out and I would never
change that mindset. I play this game [because] I love it.”139
ESPN reported that Butt procured an LOV insurance policy at
some point before the Orange Bowl game in which he sustained his
right knee injury.140  Butt can recover under the terms of his LOV
policy if he drops below the second round of the 2017 NFL Draft.141
Butt’s selection in the 2017 NFL Draft proves interesting on a
couple levels.  Draft experts consider the 2017 tight end class as the
Smith as “explosive defender” with rare lateral speed and ability to change direc-
tion with suddenness in space).
131. See Mather, supra note 125; Jaylon Smith Prospect Profile, supra note 130.
132. See Mather, supra note 125.
133. Id.
134. See Wolverines TE Jake Butt Suffered Torn ACL in Orange Bowl, ESPN (Dec.
31, 2016), http://www.espn.com/college-football/story/_/id/18385112/michi
gan-wolverines-te-jake-butt-suffered-torn-acl-orange-bowl.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. (alteration in original) (emphasis added).  NFL scouts do not per-
form player evaluations in a talent vacuum. See Greg Gabriel, The Key to Scouting
Football Character in the NFL Draft, PRO FOOTBALL WEEKLY (Oct. 10, 2016, 1:17 PM),
http://www.profootballweekly.com/2016/10/10/greg-gabriel-the-key-to-scouting-
football-character-in-the-nfl-draft/amz3j5n/ [https://perma.cc/8H5M-GJF9].  In
addition to world class athleticism, NFL scouts place great weight on a prospect’s
“football character.” Id.  Arguably the most important aspect of a player’s football
character is his love and passion for the game. Id.
140. Wolverines TE Jake Butt Suffered Torn ACL in Orange Bowl, supra note 134.
141. Id.
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most gifted in recent memory.142  Respected scouting expert Mike
Mayock stated that “it may be the best tight end class I’ve seen since
I’ve been doing this.”143  Steelers general manager Kevin Colbert
agreed that this tight end class presents the best group of prospects
that he has seen in many years.144  Should Butt fall below second
round consideration in the 2017 NFL Draft and subsequently sub-
mit a claim to his LOV policy insurer, a defense will exist that the
depth of this year’s tight end draft class presents the reason for his
drop in draft status rather than the unfortunate injury he sustained
during the Orange Bowl.
VI. CONCLUSION
Preeminent athletes drive the amazing popularity of college
football and the NFL Draft.  If elite NFL prospects forego bowl
game competition and pre-Draft events like the NFL Scouting Com-
bine, both college football and the NFL will suffer a direct fiscal
impact.  LOV policies exist to mitigate the risk of injury- induced
loss in draft value.  However, the checkered payout history and
emerging set of coverage litigation demonstrate that LOV polices
alone do not present a panacea.
The million-dollar question becomes: where should this risk
exist?  At present, elite amateur athletes in their early-twenties bear
essentially all risk of injury and subsequent loss in draft value.  Col-
lege football has an interest in securing bowl game participation of
its most talented athletes - such that the bowl season does not be-
come an antiquated and irrelevant vestige of the past.  NFL teams
and their scouts have every interest in thoroughly evaluating pros-
pects through a series of pre-Draft scouting events such as the NFL
Scouting Combine.  With forward thinking and innovative spirit, a
solution to this present conundrum likely exists.
142. See Gerry Dulac, This Year Could Be Special for Tight Ends at the NFL Draft,
PITTSBURG POST-GAZETTE (Mar. 7, 2017, 12:00 AM), http://www.post-gazette.com/
sports/steelers/2017/03/07/tight-ends-steelers-nfl-combine-draft-oj-howard-adam-
shaheen/stories/201703070060 [https://perma.cc/HV6Y-84PQ].
143. Id.
144. Id.  In addition to Butt, other top flight tight end prospects in this year’s
draft class include, without limitation, O.J. Howard (University of Alabama), Evan
Engram (University of Mississippi), David Njoku (University of Miami) and Bucky
Hodges (Virginia Tech). Id.
20
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 24, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol24/iss2/2
